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Impact evaluationDespite a theoretical literature that promises that land transfers will have large impacts on thewell-being of poor
households, well-identiﬁed empirical evidence on the efﬁcacy of land redistribution is scarce. In an effort to ﬁll
this gap, this paper examines South Africa's Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program.
We exploit features of LRAD program implementation to extract exogenous variation in whether, and for how
long, applicant households enjoyed land transfers. Binary treatment estimates, which compare treated with
untreated households, show that beneﬁciary households on average experienced a 25% increase in per-capita
consumption. Our preferred continuous treatment estimates, which analyze only the subset of treated
households, identify the impact time path of land transfers on consumption. These estimates show that
living standards initially drop and then, after 3–4years, rise to 150% of their pre-transfer level. These results
are statistically signiﬁcant and robust to a statistically more conservative identiﬁcation strategy.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A rich theoretical literature suggests that asset inequality can be
economically detrimental if it leaves large numbers of low wealth
agents so poor that they are unable to fully utilize their endowments
and productive opportunities.2 From this perspective, a discrete jumptural & Resource Economics,
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ights reserved.in the productive wealth of poor agents may enable them to unlock
their unrealized potential, and generate signiﬁcant economic gains. It
is precisely this connection to incentives and market opportunities
that make asset transfer programs a potentially attractive policy option
in the ﬁght against rural poverty. This perspective also suggests that
the impacts of land and other asset transfer programs will not be
instantaneous, but will instead build up over time as beneﬁciaries
respond to, and invest in, these new opportunities.
Despite the attractiveness of these theoretical arguments for land
transfers, there has been little empirical demonstration of their
effectiveness, especially relative to the outpouring of empirical evidence
on cash transfer programs. This paper provides some of the ﬁrst
well-identiﬁed estimates of the poverty reduction impacts of land
redistribution. Our preferred continuous impact estimates of a South
African land reform program, which analyze only households that
received transfers, reveal that these transfers increase medium-term
household living standards by 50%. The estimated temporal impact
pattern also mimics that predicted by the theoretical literature. By
way of comparison, Behrman et al. (2005) indicate that Mexico's
well-studied cash transfer program will only boost per-capita living
standards by less than 5% in the long-term.
The relative scarcity of empirical evidence on land transfers is
understandable. While, the last century has seen any number of land
redistribution schemes, they are hard to evaluate because the events
giving rise to them are decidedly non-random, and options for credibly
identifying their impacts are few. At themacro-level, much of the related
evidence on egalitarian land ownership derives from cross-country
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land ownership and aggregate economic growth.3 These studies suffer
the usual questions concerning data comparability and differences in
historical legacies across societies that may confound causal inter-
pretation of the impact of greater land ownership equality.
At the micro-level, there is an abundant literature that suggests
that small-scale farms are more productive than large-scale farms,
seemingly indicating that land redistribution can boost living standards
and aggregate productivity.4 While linked to the traditional “economic
case for land reform,”5 few, if any, of the studies in this literature
explicitly concern redistributive reforms. Most explore data generated
by historical farm size distributions, raising a plethora of identiﬁcation
concerns (e.g., are “naturally occurring” small farms intrinsically more
productive either because they have better soils, or because they are
operated by better farmers).
The absence of studies that directly explore the causal impact of
land redistribution in part reﬂects the shift of land policy over the
last 25 years away from redistribution and towards land titling and
tenancy reform programs. But it also reﬂects the political and economic
complexities of implementing and evaluating land reforms that entail
an outright transfer of ownership from the wealthy to the poor. While
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have been used to study modest
in-kind asset transfers,6 no country to date has implemented land
redistribution by randomly distributing land to some, but not other,
potential beneﬁciaries.
This paper studies the impact of South Africa's Land Redistribution
for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program. LRAD makes land
purchase grants to landless farm workers and labor tenants. The
program does not mandate redistribution of land from rich to poor,
but rather operates through markets on a willing buyer–willing
seller basis. While the “helping hand” of the state is clearly visible in
this process, the market basis of the LRAD program can make it less
contentious, and more amenable to evaluation, than state-mandated
redistributive reforms.
To identify the impacts of land transfers, this paper exploits features
of LRAD implementation to extract exogenous variation in treatment
duration (treatment duration is the period of time that beneﬁciaries
had to work with the transferred land up until the time of this study's
survey). Individuals self-select into the LRAD applicant pool, and are
then subjected to a screening process that encompassesmultiple stages.
This screening process leads to a homogenization of sorts among the
applicant pool. Applicants with similarly high chances of succeeding as
farmers are kept in the applicant pool, while applicants with little
chance of success are dropped from the pool. This administratively
ﬁltered subset of the applicant pool ends up receiving land transfers
at different points in time leading to a variation in the duration
of treatment. We study the effect of the program by exploiting the
plausibly exogenous component of this variation.
To achieve identiﬁcation we employ generalized propensity score
(GPS) methods that allow us to match transfer beneﬁciaries based on
observable characteristics that are likely to inﬂuence both treatment
duration and its impact. We analyze beneﬁciary data under two
alternative statistical strategies. Under our core strategy, we match3 Deininger and Olinto's (2000) analysis is perhaps themost convincing analysis of this
genre because of their use of ﬁxed effects methods to control for intrinsic country
heterogeneity.
4 See for example Berry and Cline (1979), Binswanger et al. (1995), Carter (1984),
Lipton, Eastwood, and Newell (2009), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), and Shaban
(1987). See also Lipton et al. (1996) and Zyl et al. (1996) for the case of South Africa.
5 Dorner (1970) and Kanel (1968) articulate the classic instrumental economic case for
land redistribution, arguing that agency costs in agricultural labor markets create an
inverse relationship between farm productivity and size such that aggregate output and
economic performance improve with land redistribution.
6 See deMel et al. (2008) and Fafchamps et al. (2011) for examples of RCTs that transfer
non-land productive assets (e.g., sewing machines) worth a few hundred dollars to
randomly selected beneﬁciaries. These studies largely ﬁnd largemarginal returns to these
asset transfers.individuals based on their date of entry to the pipeline and other
conventional human capital characteristics. Identiﬁcation under
this strategy assumes that time in pipeline (both to approval and to
ﬁnal receipt of the land transfer) is random. While this seems
reasonable given that all individuals in the study were approved
and certiﬁed to be worthy, there might be some concern that some part
of the time to approval might be related to unobserved, productivity-
relevant characteristics. To assuage these fears, we implement a second
identiﬁcation strategy that further matches transfer recipients on the
entire time they spent in the pipeline up until the signing of the sales
contract for the land (after which further, random, delays occurred
before the land could be occupied by the beneﬁciary). While this
second, statistically conservative strategy potentially discards random
variation in treatment duration thatmight otherwise be used to identify
the impact of treatment duration, it gives similar results to the core
strategy.
Under both identiﬁcation strategies, we estimate a duration response
function by following Hirano and Imbens (2004) approach of mapping
the generalized propensity score into outcomes and then averaging
outcomes by duration level. Both estimated duration response functions
show that consumption levels initially dip (implying negative
treatment effects) for households with less than 1 year of treatment,
but then rise dramatically to peak at 50% after about three years of
exposure. Impacts of this magnitude lift the typical beneﬁciary
household from a $2 per-day poverty line standard of living to an
almost $3 per-day living standard. Impacts of this magnitude are
sufﬁciently large that they offset the direct costs of the asset transfer
grant within three to four years.
In addition to the continuous treatment estimates, we also use
standard binary treatment methods to compare all treated applicants
with a pipeline control group of approved applicants who were still
stuck in the pipeline at the time of the survey. The validity of these
estimates relies on the same assumption as the core identiﬁcation
strategy used in the continuous treatment analysis. Aswould be expected
given the distribution of treatment durations, these estimated binary
impacts are roughly half the magnitude of the long-run continuous
treatment estimates. The contrast between the binary and continuous
estimates indicates that it is important to recover the temporal impact
pattern if we are to properly understand the long-term, policy relevant
treatment effects for programs like LRAD that expand opportunity for
poor families.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes the LRAD program and builds up the logic of the two
identiﬁcation strategies. Section 3 describes the data and derives
binary treatment estimates employing the core identiﬁcation strategy.
Section 4 then presents the continuous treatment methodology
and results. In this section, we also implement the more conservative
identiﬁcation strategy mentioned above, conﬁrming that the core
continuous treatment results are robust. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper with reﬂections on the efﬁcacy of land reform as a poverty
reduction program.
2. Using LRAD program implementation to identify the impacts
of redistribution
The dispossession of the land rights of South Africa's majority
population was a cornerstone of colonial policy in South Africa and
the apartheid era that followed. Against this backdrop, the ﬁrst
democratically elected government brought forward a land reform
agenda in 1994. Ironically, the very thoroughness of dispossession
had all but eliminated the peasant smallholder class that has been
the focal point of land reform in other countries. In South Africa of
the mid-1990s, land reform was initially pursued as a restitution of
legal rights, with lesser attention to securing the economic beneﬁts
typically associated with land reform efforts. The result, perhaps
predictably, was an ineffective program that met with a sluggish
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its land reform approach in 2001, creating the LRAD program.
Styled on the willing buyer–willing seller market-assisted land
reform model (see Deininger (1999)), LRAD is intended to provide
land to black South Africans with an interest in farming, especially
women. The program requires applicants to live on or near the
land they wish to acquire through the program. Individuals who
hold public ofﬁce, civil servants, or relatives of such individuals
are ineligible.
The program works on the basis of a grant that is awarded to
beneﬁciaries on a sliding scale. The minimum grant of 20,000 South
African rands requires a matching contribution of 5000 rand (in cash
or in-kind). The maximum grant of 100,000 rand requires a matching
contribution amount of 40,000 rand. In practice, grants are pooled into
a fund that is administered on behalf of a small group of beneﬁciaries.
These funds are then used to purchase land, which becomes the
property of the beneﬁciaries.
As with other market-assisted programs, LRAD was intended to
rely on beneﬁciary self-selection to ensure that resources would be
channeled to those most interested in farming, and best able to beneﬁt
from the redistribution. While this feature is attractive from a targeting
perspective, this heavy reliance on self-selection makes it more difﬁcult
to evaluate the program.
Our identiﬁcation strategy rests upon a detailed understanding of
the mechanics of LRAD implementation. We will argue that LRAD
implementation creates exogenous variation in whether and for
how long an individual is treated (receives land). The basic idea is
similar in spirit to studies such as Lavy (2002) that rely on arbitrary
discontinuities in treatment eligibility to derive plausible counterfactuals
for non-randomly assigned treatments. While the LRAD assignment
mechanism is not based on arbitrary eligibility cutoffs as in conventional
discontinuity designs, we will show that the administrative screening of
applicants to the LRADprogrampresents options to proxy its assignment
mechanism in a way that is analogous to the Lavy study. That is,
otherwise similar households that could have been treated sooner
are denied immediate beneﬁts for arbitrary reasons that are uncorrelated
with their characteristics and their expected gains from the program.
2.1. The application and approval process
Fig. 1 illustrates the key implementation stages in the LRAD land
redistribution program. There are four main stages, each of which
generates variation in whether any potential individual beneﬁciary
was treated with a land transfer, and if so, for how long prior to this
study's survey date:
1. Beneﬁciary self-selection and application (t1)
Beneﬁciaries must choose to apply for an LRAD land grant and all of
our control group strategies will rely only on the population that
self-selected into the program. Moreover, the date by which the
individual applied for an LRAD grant will also inﬂuence whether the
individual had been granted land by the study date, t5, and for how
long (treatment duration, d). As this timing decision is likely to beFig. 1. LRAD implemerelated to both observable and unobservable productivity relevant
characteristics of the individual, all of our identiﬁcation strategies will
employ matching methods that control for application delay, d1. In the
continuous treatment analysis, early applicants with modest treatment
durations will function as controls for early applicants with long
treatment durations, while late applicants with modest treatments
will function as controls for late applicants with longer treatments.
2. Administrative approval (t2)
LRAD administrative processes are quite complex and involve the
following steps:
(1) Project registration
The ﬁrst step in the LRAD approval process is registration of
applications to the program. Once an application is submitted, a state
planner does an assessment of the site on which the applicants live as
well as the land they have applied to purchase. The purpose of this
initial assessment is both to verify the information of the applicant
against the eligibility criteria and to form an initial impression of the
resources available to the applicants as well as the constraints under
which they operate. If the application appears to be a serious prospect,
then it is “registered” as candidate land redistribution project.
(2) Planning grant approval
Approval step 2b begins when the planner requests the district land
affairs department to release a nominal sum of money to develop a
proposal on behalf of the applicant. The funds pay for various specialized
studies that the planner uses to substantiate the beneﬁciaries' business
plan and to negotiate a purchase price for the land. Examples of such
studies are property valuations, soil assessments, land surveys and
whether public infrastructure is adequate for the project.
(3) Preparation of project identiﬁcation report
Once these commissioned studies materialize, the planner works
with the applicants to create a ﬁnal business plan and proposal that
is ultimately submitted to the state to justify the LRAD transfer. This
proposal preparation step is an important process that is handled
through a series of workshops between relevant stakeholders and
culminates in the preparation of a document called the project
identiﬁcation report (PIR), which summarizes the merits of the
application. The existence of this document is an important milestone
in the approval process as it signals that the applicants have a strong
enough interest and background in farming to have warranted the
release and expenditure of state resources to begin making the case
for the grant.
(4) District Screening Committee approval
In approval step 2d, the planner submits the PIR document to a
District-level Screening Committee (DSC) of the land affairs department.
This body has a broad representation from all stakeholders including
ofﬁcials from the agriculture department, the surveyor general's ofﬁce
and local municipalities. The role of the DSC is to screen applications
before they are passed on for ﬁnal approval by the provincial committee.ntation timeline.
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designate the land for redistributive purposes is made. At this stage the
“designation memo” is prepared. This document contains a summary
of the merits of each LRAD application. The specialist reports generated
in approval step 2c are used to assess the feasibility of the proposed
activities of the applicants. The provincial committee reviews this
document before making the ﬁnal decision about whether or not to
approve the application.
As the complexity of this process makes clear, delays in applicant
approval could occur for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons
(e.g., a bad proposal) are of course endogenous to applicant
characteristics, and expected gains from a transfer, while others
are the more innocuous sort of bad luck and bureaucratic delays
that crop up during any complex administrative procedure. In the
analysis to follow, we will deal with the endogenous portion of this
delay in two ways. First, we will restrict our attention only to the
population that successfully navigated approval step 2d. This restriction
by deﬁnition eliminates the weaker proposals and applicants from our
study population.
However, one might still worry that the best of the better proposals
got approved more quickly, thus making treatment, and a longer
duration of treatment, more likely. Ideally, we would like therefore
to be able to match on approval delay time, d2 in Fig. 1, as well as
application delay. However, we lack data on the date at which the
designationmemowas signed. As a secondary strategy wewill therefore
employ a statistically more conservative matching strategy, as we now
explain.
3. Signing of sales contract with land seller (t3)
Once approved by the district committee, the self-selected,
administratively approved potential LRAD beneﬁciaries face two
additional sources of delay. Interviews with program administrators
in the ﬁeld revealed that in practice administratively approved
applications often become mired down, facing considerable and
highly variable delays in receiving their land, if they receive it at
all. One reason for further delay is that the initially willing land-seller
(whose assent was obtained in stage 2b) might renege at the last
minute, perhaps as a strategy to renegotiate the selling price or simply
to avoid new neighbors.7 While these delays, which seem mostly
related to seller characteristics, are likely to be exogenous to expected
impacts of transfers, we might worry that such delays are more likely
when the land to be transferred is of a different quality. Fortunately,
we observe the date on which the sale agreement was signed (t3 in
Fig. 1) and thus have the option to employ propensity score methods
that control for the combined approval and sales delay, d23. Note that
controlling for this variable takes care of concerns about endogeneity
in both stages 2 and 3. It will also throw away substantial exogenous
variation (meaning those delays of bad luck that had nothing to do
with beneﬁciary or project characteristics). Given that it cannot be
determined how much, if any, of the d23 delay is endogenous, we will
refer to our identiﬁcation strategies that control for this delay as
“statistically conservative.”8
4. Legal transfer of land to beneﬁciary (t4)
The ﬁnal delay potentially faced by LRAD beneﬁciaries is the formal
titling and transfer of the land after a signed sales contract is in hand.
While this would seem to be a routine administrative process, in fact
such was not the case. Interviews with LRAD staff reveal that given
the history of apartheid, it was not infrequent that an LRAD sale was7 A reason less frequently cited for delays in ﬁnal approval of an application concerns a
failure by local councils to meet their targeted roll-out of basic infrastructure in a district
affected by an impending redistribution of land.
8 It also cannot be determined what the bias of any endogenous delay elements would
be as some delays may signal lower quality projects, while others may signal higher
quality projects.delayed or blocked by the discovery of a pending legal claim for the
land offered up by the seller. Such claims typically resulted from legal
actions of the descendants of individuals who had been previously
dispossessed under Apartheid and who could demand return of
the land under a Mandela-era land restitution program. While
new applications to that program were terminated in 1999, it left a
substantial overhang of unresolved land claims, making it legally
impossible in some cases to transfer land title deeds to approved
LRAD beneﬁciaries many years later. In the analysis to follow, we will
treat such variation as exogenous to expected impacts. Section 4.4
below provides evidence corroborating the claim that these d4 delays
are exogenous and respond to legal-bureaucratic forces.
2.2. Filtered pipeline identiﬁcation strategies
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the LRAD application
process is subject to an array of forces and delays. Such delays not
only determinewhether an individual is treated at all, it also determines
the duration of treatment deﬁned as in Fig. 1 as the time between ﬁnal
land transfer and the date of the research survey.9 While subsequent
sections will detail the precise estimation methods to be employed, we
are now positioned to summarize the two fundamental identiﬁcation
strategies that will be employed:
• Core identiﬁcation strategy
The core strategy builds both treatment and control groups from the
population that has (i) self-selected into the program; and (ii) been
administratively ﬁltered and approved (i.e., cleared stage 2 above). In
addition, both the binary and continuous treatment analyses that will
be constructed on this basis will use propensity score techniques to
control for application date or delay d1 in Fig. 1. For the continuous
treatment analysis, only households that had also exited the pipeline
and received their land prior to the survey date will be considered.
• Statistically conservative identiﬁcation strategy
The conservative strategy augments the core strategy by also
controlling for the full approval and sales delay (d23 in Fig. 1). This
strategy is conservative in that it clearly throws out exogenous variation
that could aid and strengthen identiﬁcation in order to purge the
analysis of suspected sources of delay that are endogenous to applicant
and project characteristics that may be correlated with expected
impacts. Because this strategy requires information on the date on
which the sale agreement was eventually signed, it is only available
for the subset of survey respondents who had in fact received land
transfers (i.e., the treatment group). This strategy therefore cannot be
adopted when looking at binary impacts that compare treated with
untreated households as the untreated households for the most part
do not yet have a signed sales contract.
3. Land redistribution impacts: descriptive statistics and binary
treatment impact estimates
As described in the prior section, LRAD is implemented at the farm
or project level, which typically brings together several beneﬁciary
families. Our sampling followed a multi-level design in which projects
were ﬁrst randomly selected from the universe of all projects (approved
or not) in the study regions, with probability of selection proportional to
the number of beneﬁciary or applicant households who were part of
the project. This random sample of LRAD projects was then subjected
to screening to get rid of weak projects and applicants. As explained
above, the existence of a signed “designationmemo” (step 2d described
in the prior section) indicates that a project and its applicants successfully9 While the survey date is similar for most respondents, delays due to a hold-up of
ﬁeldwork implementation in some districts resulted in further exogenous variation in
the duration of exposure to the land transfer.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Treated Pipeline control Duration of treatment
N0–2 2–3 3–5
Years Years Years
Per-capita consumption (2005 Rands) 594.5⁎⁎ 466.4 486.6 548.1 749.1
(1098.1) (692.0) (906.2) (713.1) (1485.7)
Days since application 1803.1⁎ 1675.7 1775.6 1717.6 1908.0
(761.1) (1302.1) (865.9) (714.9) (670.2)
Family labor 0.787⁎⁎ 0.436 1.156 0.496 0.658
(1.291) (0.942) (1.789) (0.791) (0.870)
Gender of household head (1 if male) 0.754⁎⁎ 0.667 0.725 0.719 0.816
(0.431) (0.472) (0.448) (0.451) (0.389)
Education of household head (years) 6.447⁎ 5.843 5.088 7.193 7.217
(4.880) (4.496) (4.058) (5.084) (5.198)
Farming experience (mean of household in years) 1.594 1.464 1.361 1.292 2.108
(3.706) (3.784) (3.754) (2.213) (4.581)
Household size 6.060 6.138 6.675 5.852 5.599
(3.532) (3.732) (4.013) (3.192) (3.192)
Household relocated to participate 0.208⁎⁎ 0.0727 0.206 0.126 0.283
(0.406) (0.260) (0.406) (0.333) (0.452)
Distance to nearest neighbor (km) −0.440 −1.149 −0.768 −0.0627 −0.370
(2.744) (2.328) (2.841) (2.717) (2.628)
Restitution overlap (1 if application overlaps with restitution program) 0.248 0.258 0.265 0.238 0.237
(0.432) (0.438) (0.442) (0.428) (0.427)
Entry time (months elapsed from program start date to decision to apply) 26.76 18.54 23.94 28.21 28.86
(33.93) (29.49) (30.03) (25.22) (43.13)
Pipeline time to sales contract (months) 25.37 . 30.94 22.18 22.34
(29.20) (.) (29.34) (20.51) (34.02)
Final pipeline delay time (months) 3.810 . 4.384 3.263 3.673
(8.128) (.) (8.303) (4.966) (9.830)
n 448 1202 176 139 163
Notes: The stars in column 1 indicate whether the differences in means for the relevant variables between the treated and pipeline control groups are statistically signiﬁcant:
⁎⁎= signiﬁcant at1 %level; ⁎= signiﬁcant at 5%level.
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for the existence of this document for sampled projects, screening out
those for which the designation memo did not exist. Projects screened
out at this level were replaced by newly randomly selected projects
and the process was repeated until the desired sample of stage 2d
administratively-approved projects was obtained. In the remainder
of this section, we ﬁrst look at descriptive statistics from this sample,
examining characteristics of beneﬁciaries and non-beneﬁciaries. We
further break down the beneﬁciary group by treatment duration,
as variation in duration is the center of our primary identiﬁcation
strategy. The section closes by using a conventional binary treatment
estimator to gauge the average impact of land on beneﬁciaries relative
to approved applicants still stuck in the pipeline at the time of the
survey.
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the key
variables used in our analysis. Since we are interested in measuring
the impact of LRAD on living standards, our primary outcome variable
is monthly per capita consumption expenditures.10 Table 1 shows that
mean per-capita consumption in treatment households is 128 rands
(or 28%) higher than mean consumption for the untreated, pipeline
control group. This difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
As already mentioned, our primary analysis will focus on those
LRAD applicants who had already exited the pipeline and had received
land for some period of time prior to the survey. Table 1 disaggregates10 Results are unaffected if we normalize consumption by adult equivalents instead of by
the number of household members. We also do not normalize expenditures by a poverty
line, because there is some controversy in the case of South Africans to which is the most
appropriate line to use (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2007).these treated households into treatment terciles based on the duration
of time since they had received their land transfers. As can be seen,
mean per-capita consumption for treated households that had enjoyed
their land transfer for less than two years is a modest 4% higher
than that of the untreated pipeline control group. Households observed
2–3years after the transfer have 18% higher consumption than pipeline
control households, while households with more than 3 years
experience with the transferred lands have expenditures that are 61%
higher.
These data were not generated by a controlled experiment, and we
need to be wary of possible confounding factors that invalidate these
unconditional inter-group differences as causal impact estimates. One
possible confound is that pipeline control households or households
with low treatment duration applied later to the program. Application
time may proxy for eagerness and expected gains from the program.
Table 1 displays information on the timing of entry into the pipeline
(d1). As can be seen, treated households on average applied about
8.2 months earlier than did control households. This difference is
statistically signiﬁcant. The differences in application date are less
pronounced amongst the treated population. Households with less
than 2years of treatment applied about 4.5months later than households
with higher treatment durations. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant.
The entry time delays for households with intermediate treatment levels
(2–3 years) are nearly identical to that of households with more than
3 years of treatment. Together, these results suggest that any statistical
approach needs to control for these differences.
Another possible confound is that better applicantsmay traverse the
full transfer processmore quickly. Asmentioned in the prior section,we
lack data on the time it took each applicant to receive full District
Screening Committee approval. For most treated applicants, we do
have the full pipeline time from application to signing of the sales
contract (which subsumes the delay to full District Screening approval).
As can be seen in Table 1, the pipeline time to sales contract measure is
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compared to the other treated groups. This pipeline measure is almost
identical (22 months) for treated applicants with 2–3 years and more
than years of treatment duration. It is of course possible that the longer
delays experienced by applicants with less than 2 years of treatment
reﬂects administrative congestion (as these applicants applied later)
rather than applicant weakness. Nonetheless, in our more conservative
identiﬁcation strategy, we will also match on this total pipeline delay
time as well as on the application delay.
Other differences among treated households are also apparent
in Table 1; namely gender (terciles 1 and 2 and terciles 1 and 3),
geographic mobility (terciles 2 and 3) and spatial connectedness
proxied by the geographical distance to the households nearest
neighbor (terciles 1 and 2). Similar patterns hold for the overall
treatment-control comparison with the exception that education
also emerges as a statistically signiﬁcant difference. We now consider
propensity score estimation techniques that allow us to control for
these potentially confounding factors.Table 2
Determinants of treatment.
Binary treatmenta
Model 1
Gender of household head (1 if male) 0.3533⁎
(0.146)
Education of household head (years) −0.8671⁎⁎⁎
(0.259)
Education squared 0.0063
(0.004)
Farming experience (mean of household in years) −1.8195⁎⁎
(0.587)
Farming experience squared −0.0024
(0.002)
Education × farming experience 0.1462
(0.081)
Household size 0.0012
(0.020)
Household relocated to participate 1.3212⁎⁎⁎
(0.205)
Days since application 44.7874⁎⁎⁎
(3.745)
Days squared −3.0578⁎⁎⁎
(0.253)
Days× education 0.1076⁎⁎
(0.034)
Days× farming experience 0.2433⁎⁎
(0.078)
Days× farming experience × education −0.0188
(0.011)
Family labor 0.3424⁎⁎⁎
(0.064)
Pipeline time to sales contract (months)
Pipeline time squared
Pipeline time × farming experience
Pipeline time × education
Pipeline time × education × farming experience
Distance to nearest neighbor (km)
Constant −164.4611⁎⁎⁎
(13.878)
Observations 1650
Log-likelihood −732.5
x2 464.7
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to clustering.
a Dependent variable equals 1 if treated, zero if pipeline control.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001.3.2. Binary impact estimates: average treatment effects on the treated
Before turning to the continuous treatment estimates that are the
centerpiece of this paper, we beginwithmethodologicallymore familiar
binary ATT impact estimates. For this analysis, we focus on LRAD
applicant households that had received District Screening Committee
approval (step 2d), denoting thosewho had received land by the survey
date as treated (Di=1) and those who were still waiting in the pipeline
as untreated (Di=0). Because LRAD land grants were not distributed
through a controlled experiment, we need to be mindful of possible
differences between the treated and the untreated groups, including
date of application to the program, as discussed above. To control
for these differences, we employ binary propensity score estimation
procedures. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 display the results
from two different logit propensity score models for this binary
treatment model. In addition to application date, the control variables
for the propensity score regression include standard human capital
variables.Continuous treatmentb
Model 2 Core Conservative
0.3711⁎⁎ 0.0555⁎ 0.0445
(0.144) (0.023) (0.024)
−0.7465⁎⁎ −0.0137 0.0050
(0.254) (0.012) (0.009)
0.0061 0.0013⁎ 0.0002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
−1.7313⁎⁎ 0.0534⁎⁎ 0.0250⁎⁎
(0.568) (0.019) (0.009)
−0.0028 −0.0001 0.0000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
0.1456 −0.0055⁎ −0.0032⁎⁎
(0.079) (0.003) (0.001)
0.0212 −0.0057 −0.0073⁎
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
1.3681⁎⁎⁎ 0.0325 0.0378
(0.200) (0.025) (0.025)
43.9662⁎⁎⁎ 0.0005⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎
(3.656) (0.000) (0.000)
−2.9925⁎⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎⁎⁎
(0.247) (0.000)
0.0906⁎⁎ 0.0000
(0.033) (0.000)
0.2335⁎⁎ −0.0000⁎
(0.076) (0.000)
−0.0186 0.0000⁎
(0.011) (0.000)
−0.0042⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
0.0000⁎⁎⁎
(0.000)
−0.0009⁎⁎
(0.000)
−0.0002⁎
(0.000)
0.0002⁎⁎⁎
(0.000)
−0.0006
(0.001)
−161.9010⁎⁎⁎ −0.2611⁎ 0.3123⁎⁎⁎
(13.563) (0.127) (0.053)
1650 438 379
−747.6 73.93 89.81
434.5 92.53 74.67
Table 3
Average treatment effect on treated: percentage change in per-capita consumption.
Kernel Bandwidth ATT t-Ratio t-Ratio
Analytical Bootstrappeda
Gaussian (ﬁxed bandwidth) 0.05 28.36 2.04 2.41
Gaussian (optimal bandwidth) 0.26 22.77 1.72 1.84
Epanechnikov (optimal bandwidth) 0.59 22.34 1.69 1.88
Quartic (optimal bandwidth) 0.69 22.45 1.69 1.69
Rectangular (optimal bandwidth) 0.23 25.16 1.85 1.96
Tricube (optimal bandwidth) 0.50 24.39 1.82 1.76
Notes:
a Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated over 250 replications.
12 Matching occurs over the region of common support of the log–odds ratio, with a
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common support of pi between the D=1 and D=0 distributions, and
let N1 denote the set of households that have already received land
through LRAD, and N0 denote the set of households still in the pipeline.
Further denote n1 as the number of treated households falling into the
common support region of the estimated propensity score density;
i.e., the number of households falling into the set N1∩Sp. Our matching
estimator is then given by
δ ¼ n1ð Þ−1
X
i∈N1∩Sp
y1i−E^ y0ijDi ¼ 1; pið Þ
 
¼ n1ð Þ−1
X
i∈N1∩Sp
y1i−
X
j∈N0
ω i; jð Þy0 j
0@ 1A
ð1Þ
where i ∈ N1∩Sp denotes the ith treated household from the set of
households with common support on pi. The second term in this
expression serves as a matched substitute for the outcomes of a
randomized-out household of the treatment group, where the imputed
counterfactual outcome∑ j∈N0 ω i; jð Þy0 j is a kernel-weighted average
over the set of possible matches, with weight function:
ω i; jð Þ ¼ K x
′
jβ−x′iβ
hn
 !
=
X
k∈N0
K
x′kβ−x′iβ
hn
 !
ð2Þ
where K is a kernel function, hn is a bandwidth parameter and x
′
iβ is the
log of odds ratio.11
Looking more closely at the propensity score estimates shown in
Table 2 we see that the intended targeting of women by the LRAD
program does not seem to be borne out by the data, as approved
female-headed households have a lower probability than male-headed
households of ﬁnally gaining access to LRAD grants than do male-
headed households. The estimated coefﬁcients also indicate that
farming experience and education appear to combine non-linearly
with the timing of entry into the applicant pool to signiﬁcantly affect
the treatment probability.While the rationale behind these interactions is
not apparent, the reported speciﬁcations dominate a more parsimonious
model without the interaction terms (not reported here), and achieve a
correct prediction rate of 76%. The reported speciﬁcations also adequately
balance the data by conventional tests (results available from the
authors). The second propensity score speciﬁcation is identical to the
ﬁrst except that it eliminates the family labor stock variable. While
matching on this variable is arguably warranted as family labor is an
important complementary resource to land, it is arguably itself affected
by the treatment. Reliance on this second propensity score model has
no impact on the estimated treatment effects.11 Under our logit speciﬁcation, pi ¼ ex′β= 1þ ex′β
 
, and 1−pi ¼ 1= 1þ ex′iβ
 
and thus
the log odds ratio is given by ln p= 1−pð Þð Þ ¼ x′iβ. While it is usual to match directly on pi,
we here follow Heckman and Todd (2009) and match on log odds as this procedure is
robust for samples in which the true sampling weights are unknown, as they are in our
study.Based on themodel 1 propensity score estimates, Table 3 reports the
estimated impacts of treatment on household per-capita consumption
for ﬁve different kernel functions.12 The ﬁrst estimate, based on a
standard Gaussian kernel with a ﬁxed global bandwidth of 0.05,
yields an estimate average treatment effect of 28%. The other
estimates tall employ optimal bandwidths computed according to
the approach of Silverman (1986). For the Gaussian kernel, the
estimated treatment effect declines to 23%when an optimal bandwidth
is employed. Results for the other kernels shown in the table range
from 22% to 25%.
Contingent on the identifying assumption that untreated, but
administratively approved households, are a valid control group for
treated LRAD beneﬁciaries once matched on application date and
routine human capital variables, these estimates indicated that on
average LRAD land transfer grants boost household living standards by
at least 20%. By way of comparison, Behrman et al. (2005) estimate
that 7 years of monthly cash transfers in Mexico's Progresa program13
would increase total future income by only 8%. Of course in the
short-run (while receiving transfers), cash transfer beneﬁciaries
experience substantial total income increases, as much as 20% in
the case of Progresa program, an amount still below the estimated
binary treatment effect of the LRAD asset transfer program. While
these average impacts are sizeable, they tell us little about whether
and how these impacts change over time as beneﬁciary households
gain more experience exploiting the productive assets made available
to them by the LRAD program.
4. The impact dynamics of land transfers: duration analysis of
treated households only
Given the quasi-experimental nature of our study design, beneﬁciary
households received land grants at different points in time. Within our
sample, some treated households had received land ﬁve years before
the survey date, while others had only recently received transfers. The
impact on the level of economic well-being of the latter group might
well be negligible if no income had yet been generated by the newly
acquired land. Indeed, if these households were simultaneously co-
investing in the newly acquired land, the short run impact on household
income and consumption could even be negative. In this case, the
Section 3 estimated average treatment effect on the treated would
present a data-weighted average of zero or negative impacts for recent
beneﬁciaries and perhaps positive impacts for beneﬁciaries with longer
land access.
In addition to this possible ﬁrst year dip in living standards, there are
two other reasons why the impact of an asset transfer may change over
time. First, the beneﬁciary may experience a learning effect with
technical and entrepreneurial efﬁciencies improving over time. Second,
and consistent with the theoretical literature on asset inequality and
poverty discussed earlier, the asset transfer may create a crowding-in
effect if the beneﬁciary further invests in the new enterprises made
possible by the LRAD grant. Whether this additional investment occurs
because of improved access to ﬁnancial markets, or because of learning
effects, the overall impacts on beneﬁciarywell-being are likely to be large
in the long run especially if LRAD transfers sufﬁce to lift households over
the sort of critical threshold asset level that ﬁgures prominently in the
poverty traps literature.14 It is these second round or multiplier effects
that are likely to distinguish asset transfer programs from other anti-
poverty policy instruments.further 2% trimming rule imposed.
13 Excluding administrative costs, the direct cost of these cash transfers would be
approximately $US4600, an amount similar to the direct costs of an LRAD grant.
14 Contributions to this literature that focus on critical minimum asset thresholds and
thus suggest a strong role for asset redistributions a la LRAD include Galor, Carter and
Barrett (2006), Carter and Lybbert (2012), Moav and Vollrath (2009), and Mookherjee
and Ray (2002).
16 This is essentially a weaker version of the Rosenbaum and Rubin's (1983) “strong
ignorability” assumption, generalized to multi-valued treatments. Hirano and Imbens
(2004) refer to this assumption as weak unconfoundedness as it does not require joint
independence of all potential outcomes, y dð Þf gt∈ t0 ;t1½  but rather that conditional
independence holds for each value of D. For alternative approaches to non-binary
treatments, see Behrman et al. (2004) and Imai and van Dyk (2004).
17 Importantly, note that under this approach, the averaging that is used to construct
μ(d) takes places over the GPS score evaluated at the treatment level of interest, r(d,x),
and not over the GPS itself.
18 The regression function β(d,r) does not have a causal interpretation. In particular, the
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function—meaning the relationship between program impact and
duration of time since the asset was transferred—is unlikely to be a
simple step function that can be approximated with a binary treatment
estimate. The binary treatment estimates presented in the prior section
indicate that land redistribution boosts per-capita living standards by
an average of 22% to 28% relative to the pipeline control group. But
given that some of the treated population had enjoyed access to their
new land for less than a year, and others for more than 5 years, it is not
at all clear whether the 22% to 28% range is the long-run, policy relevant
treatment effect or simply somemix of short and long-run impacts. It
is possible that long-run impacts could be higher for the reasons just
discussed. It is also possible that the impacts could dissipate, as they
would in the case if the land is abandoned by their beneﬁciaries, as
has happened elsewhere (Barham and Childress, 1992). Our main
goal in this paper is to estimate the impact dynamics and duration
response function and recover both the long-run impact of land
transfers and their time path. Both are of particular relevance from a
policy perspective.
4.1. Continuous treatment estimator
A natural starting point for this analysis ordinarily would be to
consider a random coefﬁcients model (Heckman and Robb, 1985).
However, if treatment status is non-linear in beneﬁciary characteristics,
then the minimummean square error approximation to the underlying
conditional expectation function (CEF) does not have a straightforward
interpretation, because the regression coefﬁcients in such a model
would actually represent a matrix-weighted average of the gradient of
the CEF (Chamberlain and Leamer, 1976). This problem can be overcome
if the CEF of our treatment duration variable were restricted to be linear,
as in Angrist (1998), but then we would still require a large number of
observations for each value of treatment duration to justify this approach.
An alternative approach that does not necessitate such an assumption is
the extension of the propensity score approach developed by Hirano
and Imbens (2004).
We begin by restricting attention to the sample of households in the
treatment group, i∈N1.We then postulate a duration response function
yi(d) for all d ∈ D given that i ∈ N1; i.e., each household could have
any potential outcome from the set D depending on its duration of
treatment. When treatment status is binary, we have D = {0,1}, but
here we let D={d0,d1}. In the empirical implementation, we measure
duration as the number of days between the ﬁnal land transfer and
the date of the survey.
The evaluation problem of course results from the fact that each
household realizes exactly one outcome, that associated with its actual
duration in the LRAD program yi= yi(Di), where Di∈ [d0,d1]. However,
under the continuous treatment case, the problem is further complicated
by the fact that there is more than one possible counterfactual duration.
We therefore deﬁne the impact of LRAD in this continuous case in
terms of an average duration response function, μ(d) = E[yi(d)].
Our goal then is to uncover non-constant treatment effects by taking
the difference between this average and some benchmark level of
treatment:
θ dð Þ ¼ μ dð Þ−μ ed  ¼ E y dð Þ½ −E y ed h i ed;d∈D ð3Þ
where ed serves as the benchmark duration.15 In our empirical
estimates, we set ed to be the lowest length of exposure observed in
the data.15 To simplify thenotation,wedrop the i subscriptingwhenmaking reference to realized
outcomes or treatment levels.As in the binary approach, valid identiﬁcation depends on an
independence assumption regarding treatment assignment. Following
Imbens (2000), we deﬁne weak unconfoundedness16:
y dð Þ⊥Djx ∀d∈D:
To ﬁx ideas, deﬁne r(d,x), as the conditional density of treatment
duration given the covariates.
r d; xð Þ ¼ f Djx d; xð Þ ð4Þ
and deﬁne a generalized propensity score (GPS) R= r(D,X). Using this
framework, Hirano and Imbens (2004) then show that assignment to
treatment duration (or equivalently, the timing of treatment), is
unconfounded when fD(d|r(d,x),Y(d))= fD(d|r(d,X)).
Under the assumption of unconfoundedness, Hirano and Imbens
(2004) then show how the GPS can be used to identify μ(d). Two
steps are involved in this proof. First, using Bayes rule and their
Theorem 1, they show that in estimating the conditional expectation
of the outcomes, all relevant information about the conditional density
of the treatment is controlled for by directly conditioning on the
treatment level D and the generalized propensity score R^i . Second, to
estimate the duration response function, β(d,r(d,X)), at a particular level
of the treatment they average this conditional expectation over the GPS
at that particular level of the treatment, μ(d)= E[β(d, r(d,X))] and then
by iterated expectations, E[β(d, r(d,x))] = E[E[y(d)|r(d,x)]] = E[y(d)]
obtains.17 Thus knowledge of β(D,R) will identify the average duration
response function, under weak unconfoundedness conditional on the
GPS.
To implement this estimator, we follow Hirano and Imbens (2004)
and assume that the conditional density of the duration of treatment
is normally distributed with
Dijxi∼N xiβ;σ2
 
: ð5Þ
These parameters can be estimated bymaximum-likelihood, and the
estimated GPS recovered as:
R^i ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2πσ^2
p exp − 1
2σ^2
Di−dxiβ 2 : ð6Þ
To estimate the duration response function, we model the
conditional expectation of yi, as a ﬂexible function of Di and Ri
β Di;Rið Þ ¼ E YijDi; R^i
h i
¼ α0 þ α1Di þ α2D2i þ α3R^i
þ jα4R^2i þ α5DiR^i
: ð7Þ
Eq. 7 is then estimated by OLS.18 Once we have estimated the
parameter vector α, we can then recover the average duration response
function E[y(d)]. Recall that E[y(d)] is identiﬁed for particular levels of
duration, so the averagemust be taken over all households (irrespective
of their realized treatment duration) at each duration level d. Byderivative with respect to the treatment level d does not represent an average effect of
changing the level of treatment for any particularly subpopulation.We also experimented
with various speciﬁcations for this regression and conclude that not much additional
explanatory power is added by including higher than second-order polynomials in D
and R^.
Table 4
Bayes factor tests of equality of conditional covariate means.
Variable Normalized treatment intervals
[0,0.37] [0.37,0.47] [0.47,1]
Gender of household head (1 if male) 6.1213 1.4979 6.8357
Education of household head (years) 4.4726 2.2034 3.9089
Education squared 2.4537 1.5833 4.6867
Farming experience (mean of household in years) 6.7236 3.8165 6.6694
Farming experience squared 6.637 3.0129 6.5379
Education × farming experience 6.2594 4.8765 5.9455
Household size 2.55 6.203 5.0907
Household relocated to participate 5.7877 0.9285 2.683
Days since application 2.1685 6.2083 1.4708
Pipeline time to sales contract (months) 6.6155 1.8842 3.745
Pipeline time to sales squared 6.0723 1.0302 0.7976
Pipeline time × farming experience 6.0176 3.5222 6.5296
Pipeline time × education 2.4063 6.0603 6.02
Pipeline time × education × farming experience 5.3198 5.6462 6.5704
Distance to nearest neighbor (km) 6.4032 6.1707 6.3807
21 We also estimated Eq. 7 in levels, implying that each treatment duration has the same
absolute effect on per-capita expenditure. These resultswere qualitatively the same as the
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recover an estimate of the entire duration response function.19 This
procedure gives a treatment effect estimator of the form:
ψ^ dð Þ ¼ dE Y dð Þ½  ¼ 1
n1
Xn1
i¼1
ðα^0 þ α^1  dþ α^2  d2 þ α^3  r^ d;xið Þ
þ α^4  r^ d;xið Þ2 þ α^5  d  r^ d;xið ÞÞ
ð8Þ
Finally, to compute a non-constant effect of treatment on treated, we
estimate.
θ^ dð Þ ¼ ψ^ dð Þ−ψ^ ed  ∀d∈D; ð9Þ
where ed has been ﬁxed at the benchmark level discussed earlier.
4.2. Generalized propensity score estimates and balancing tests
As noted above, the continuous treatment variable is the duration of
exposure to the LRAD program, measured as the normalized number of
days elapsed since the date of transfer of the land.20 Table 2 presents
maximum likelihood estimates of the conditional distribution of this
treatment variable under both the core and statistically conservative
identiﬁcation. In addition to the human capital variables, the core
strategy controls for application delay, whereas the conservative
strategy further controls for total pipeline time up to the signing of
the land sales contract. Both models satisfy the normality assumption
as the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality of the conditional errors
is passed at the 1% level.
The core model results in Table 2 not surprisingly show that
application date is correlated with duration of treatment. Including it,
and the other variables (such as farming experience, which is also a
signiﬁcant determinant of treatment) allows us to match these variables
in the continuous treatment impact estimates. Similarly, the conservative
model estimates show that, as expected, longer pipeline delays reduce the
duration of treatment. Before turning to the impact results themselves,
we ﬁrst test the ability of the GPS estimates to balance the data.
To test the GPS balancing property, we follow Hirano and Imbens
(2004) and Bia and Mattei (2008). We ﬁrst partition the support of D
into three mutually exclusive intervals, denoted as G1,…,G3. Within
each treatment interval Gk, we compute the GPS r dGk ; xi
 
at the mean
of the interval dGk∈Gk. Then, for each of the three intervals we estimate
the GPS at these treatment interval means dGk and then discretize
the distribution of the GPS evaluated at this representative point.
In our model, we chose six mutually exclusive blocks, denoted by
B1
(k),…, B6(k). Within each interval Bj(k) for j= 1,…,6 and k= 1,2,3, we
compute the difference in means for each covariate across different
treatment intervals, but in the same GPS interval (i.e., j is held constant
while k is varied). This results in six mean differences for each dGk∈Gk .
This information is then collapsed into a single metric, by taking a
weighted average of the differences at each representative point,
where the weights are equivalent to the number of observations within
each block Bj(k). This procedure is repeated for each covariate. In a ﬁnal
step, these weighted averages are then used to construct test statistics.
We conducted this test of each of the speciﬁcations of the GPS reported
in Table 2. Table 4 reports Bayes factors that are computed off of the
weighted averages that are based on the conservative core model.
Decisive rejection of the null that the data are balanced requires a
minimum Bayes factor of less than 0.01. Overall, the model is well
balanced as the lowest Bayes factor of 0.3364 falls within an acceptable
range of Jefferys' order of magnitude criterion. In particular, time since19 We estimate standard errors and conﬁdence intervals for each point along the
duration response function using bootstrap methods.
20 We normalize the treatment variable dividing days treated by the maximum number
of days a household could have been exposed to the program.application and total time in pipeline (from application to sales
contract) is balanced by the model.
4.3. Estimated impact dynamics
The solid line in Fig. 2 graphs the duration response function, dE Y dð Þ½ ,
estimated using the core model parameters reported in Table 5. Eq. 7
was estimated using the natural logarithm of per-capita monthly
expenditures as the dependent variable.21 The corresponding 95%
conﬁdence interval (calculated using bootstrap re-sampling) is
shown by dotted lines. The dashed horizontal line is the benchmark,
null treatment estimate, μ^ ed . By coincidence, this line also marks
the level of the two-dollar a day international poverty line converted
to South African rand using the PPP exchange rate for 2006. This two-
dollar a day poverty line (which is equivalent to about 250 rand per-
person, per-month at the PPP exchange rate) is substantially lower than
the national poverty line of 430 rand per-person, per-month which has
been suggested by the South African Treasury.22
As is apparent from Fig. 2, the continuous treatment impact estimator
is quite different from the simple step function thatwould indicate binary
treatment estimates to capture all the relevant dimensions of program
impact. Noticeable is the sharp drop in consumption over the ﬁrst year
of exposure, and then a period of quick recovery over the second year.
Beyond the second year, the estimated average treatment effect rises
further to levels that are approximately 50% higher than the international
poverty line and the null treatment benchmark. As can be seen, increases
of this magnitude take households that are in the vicinity of the
poverty line and lift them well above it. In addition, with an average
of 5 individuals per-family, the estimated increase in per-capita
monthly expenditures implies a total annual household expenditure
increase of some 7200 rand per-year. With a typical grant of 20,000
rand, it takes only a few years for these total returns to swamp the direct
monetary value of the grant. Before considering further the meaning of
these results, we ﬁrst check their robustness under more conservative
identiﬁcation assumptions.
4.4. Robustness check using conservative identiﬁcation strategy
Under our basic identiﬁcation strategy, both binary and continuous
treatment estimators reveal that land transfers had signiﬁcant impactslog estimates shownhere, except that absolute average effectswere somewhat larger than
those implied by the log changes.
22 See the comprehensive benchmarking exercises reported in Woolard and Leibbrandt
(2007) for further background information on themeasurement and reporting of poverty
in South Africa.
Table 6
OLS estimates of determinants of ﬁnal delay time.
Legal transfer
Delay, d4
Pipeline time to sales contract (months) −0.0172
(0.042)
Entry time (months elapsed from program start
date to decision to apply)
−0.0187
(0.013)
Gender of the household head (1 if male) 0.4159
(1.028)
Education of the household head (years) 0.3345
(0.382)
Farming experience (mean of household in years) 0.1452
(0.396)
Household relocated to participate 0.7632
(1.055)
Distance to nearest neighbor (km) 0.0532
(0.032)
Education squared −0.0192
(0.025)
Farming experience squared −0.0261
(0.014)⁎
Education × farming experience 0.0907
(0.053)⁎⁎
Household size 0.1445
(0.138)
Pipeline time to sales contract (months) squared 0.0002
(0.000)
Pipeline time × farming experience 0.0203
(0.015)
Pipeline time × education −0.0009
(0.004)
Pipeline time × education × farming experience −0.0041
(0.002)
Restitution overlap (1 if application overlaps with
restitution program)
4.6920⁎⁎⁎
(1.107)
Constant 0.0894
(1.703)
Observations 378
R-squared
BIC 2730.0
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001.
Fig. 2. Duration response function.
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treatment methods rely on a ﬁltered pipeline strategy and also match
on time of entry to the pipeline, we might still worry that at least
some of the delay in exiting the pipeline may be related to beneﬁciary
or project characteristics and to expected impacts.
As described in Section 2 above, we can check the validity of the
basic results by employing a statistically more conservative strategy
that further controls for time in the pipeline up until the signing of the
ﬁnal sales contract. This additional control cuts into the variation
available to identify the impact of receiving land, leaving only a
variation inwhat Fig. 1 calls “legal transfer delay time”, d4 (and variation
in the survey date) to identify program impacts. While our review of
LRAD implementation suggests that this additional matching is
throwing away valid, exogenous variation in program treatment, this
section looks to see if our ﬁndings are robust to the more statistically
conservative strategy that identiﬁes based only on legal transfer delays.
As a prelude to that robustness check, we ﬁrst establish that legal
transfer delays are unrelated to things to which they should not be
(e.g., characteristics like education that are predictors of individual
productivity), and are related to things that they should be (e.g.,
administrative peculiarities that are the result of the apartheid history
of expropriation). Table 6 reports the regression of legal transfer delay
on a suite of individual characteristics plus an indicator variable that
signals when a particular project was more likely to have been delayedTable 5
OLS estimates of the conditional expectation of consumption given treatment duration
and generalized propensity score.
Core Conservative
b/se b/se
Treatment duration, Di −0.6591 −1.4524
(0.866) (1.455)
Di
2 0.4629 1.2549
(0.920) (1.520)
GPS; R^i −1.7366⁎⁎⁎ −1.0461
(0.449) (0.557)
R^
2
i 0.5788⁎⁎⁎ 0.2930
(0.169) (0.197)
Di×R^i 1.4317⁎⁎⁎ 1.2599⁎⁎
(0.334) (0.400)
Constant 6.1941⁎⁎⁎ 6.1637⁎⁎⁎
(0.211) (0.230)
Notes:
Std. errors reported in parenthesis, robust to individual clustering.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001.at the last minute by a competing restitution claim.23 As can be seen,
none of the individual characteristics statistically predict legal transfer
delays, whereas the dummy variable indicating that a property was
more likely to be subject to a competing land restitution claim is highly
signiﬁcant, increasing the legal transfer delay time by 4.7months.While
this simple test cannot conclusively show that legal delay meets the
conditional independence assumption needed for identiﬁcation in
our impact model (as it of course cannot test for independence from
unobserved factors), it is consistent with that story and illustrates that
unexpected restitution claims generated someportion of the identifying
variation.24
Table 2 presents the estimation results for this more conservative
estimation strategy. Using these newestimates, the continuous treatment23 The indicator takes on the value of 1 for LRAD applications initiated prior to the closing
of the land restitution window, as discussed in Section 2 above.
24 One could make the assumption that unobservable variables that are likely to predict
treatment duration can always be proxied for by the inclusion of d23. Though thiswould be
a strong assumption, it is probably quite plausible: for example, latent farming ability
would undoubtedly affect the speed with which an applicant traverses the approval
process. Since the variable Approval time is also insigniﬁcant in Table 6, any other omitted
variable likely to be important for predicting treatment durationwill likely be insigniﬁcant
too, if it is correlated with d23 (which it should be). Ultimately however, this must remain
as an assumption so we remain agnostic about the extent to which d23 can proxy for
unobserved variables that might affect Delay time and note merely that the robustness
check reported in Table 6 is the best we can do with the available data.
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using Eq. (8). A graph of the estimated duration response function
using the results from the more conservative strategy is virtually
indistinguishable from Fig. 2, except that, as expected, the conﬁdence
bands are a bit wider (ﬁgure available from the authors). However,
even under this conservative strategy the long run impacts remain
signiﬁcantly different from the benchmark treatment duration.
5. Discussion
Under both identiﬁcation strategies, our continuous treatment
estimator indicates that after an initial dip, the impacts of land transfer
rise steadily and after 3 to 4 years plateau at a level that implies long-
term increases in per-capita expenditures of approximately 50%.25 This
temporal pattern is consistent with the theory of costly asset inequality,
and measured impacts of this magnitude imply substantial co-
investment and improved returns to other beneﬁciary resources.
While impact evaluation of agricultural projects is often criticized for
focusing on intermediate outcomes (investment, yields or crop income)
and ignoring bottom line impacts on living standards,wehave something
of the opposite problem here. Because LRAD beneﬁciaries are spread
across the country and pursue a wide variety of activities, there is no
common crop that can be easily used as an outcome variable to shed
further light on the learning, productivity and investment patterns that
underlie the estimated living standard dynamic.26 Future work to
unpack the impacts of asset transfers would certainly be warranted.
While there is still much to learn about how asset transfer programs
work, comparison with estimated income increases predicted to result
from cash transfer programs is again instructive. As discussed above,
Behrman, Sengupta and Todd calculate that cash transfers raise earnings
by 8% in the long-run, implying an approximately 2% increase in per-
capita consumption. Similarly, the Agüero, Carter, and Woolard (2011)
study of South Africa's Child Support Grant calculates that the early
childhood nutritional impacts of that cash grant would increase adult
earnings by some 3% in the long-run. Where it is possible to make
these comparisons, the long-run impacts of these cash transfer programs,
though not insigniﬁcant, are one to two orders ofmagnitude smaller than
the estimated long-run effects of LRAD transfers. It is of course possible
that monthly cash grants could also crowd-in additional investment
and intermediate income growth. The only evidence we know on this
point is the work by Gertler et al. (2012) who ﬁnd that Progresa cash
transfers had long-run investment impacts on the order of about 18%.
In summary, the estimated duration response function accords with
what one would expect of an asset transfer program like LRAD. More
generally, as King and Behrman (2009) have argued, a variety of factors
might account for why there could be a lag, or more gradual realization
of the beneﬁts of anti-poverty programs. This is especially the case
for a program like LRAD, which is aimed not only at affecting rural
livelihoods directly, by also changing learning opportunities and
investment incentives.
6. Conclusion
The largely theoretical literature on asset inequality has long
suggested that asset transfers—such as land redistribution—can be25 A similar temporal impact pattern is found in the Tjernström et al.'s (2014) study of a
small farm development program in Nicaragua.
26 There are very few crops grown consistently across the sample. Extracting the most
widely grown crop (maize) results in a very small matched sample that lacks the power
to detect signiﬁcant effects on yields. However, a simple aggregation of total yields of
agricultural output within households does have power and shows an increasing pattern
that is broadly consistent with the estimated per-capita expenditure dynamic, but it is
unclear what interpretation to give to this ﬁnding. We therefore have not interrogated
these results in any depth but would be happy to provide them upon request. In terms
of investment indicators, the available survey data includes capital stock measures, but
lacks the price information to aggregate them into an indicator that could be analyzed.an effective anti-poverty tool.27 Asset transfer programs are confronted
by fewer questions about work disincentives than are cash transfer
programs. In principal, theseprograms also have the potential to generate
very high rates of return if they succeed in unlocking the productive
potential of the poor by improving their market access and perhaps
getting them over the sort of critical minimum threshold hypothesized
by the poverty traps literature.
Despite this promise, well-identiﬁed empirical evidence on efﬁcacy
of land redistribution has been scarce, in no small part because most
reforms arise endogenously, either as a response to, or as a cause of,
conﬂict. This fact places limits on the uses of experimental approaches
to identify impacts. For this paper, we have been able to explore a low
conﬂict situation (land redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa)
and exploit the fact that the implementation of its market-assisted land
reform program generated something akin to a natural experiment,
allowing identiﬁcation of the impact of land transfers on the economic
well-being of poor and near poor households.
Binary treatment effect estimates, which compare treated with
approved but untreated households stuck in the administrative pipeline,
show that land transfers boost household living standards by 25%.
More interestingly, our continuous treatment estimates, which are
based on exploiting different treatment durations among the sets of
LRAD applicants who actually received land transfers, show that living
standards initially dip with the land transfers, but then after three years
rise to levels that imply a 50% increase in living standards of the treated
households who entered the program with poverty line standards of
living. Both the temporal patterns of this impact, and its magnitude, are
consistent with the theoretical literature on asset transfers and their
potential to crowd-in investment, learning and income increases beyond
what would be expected from the direct transfer alone. These results are
robust to a statistically more conservative identiﬁcation strategy.
So does land redistribution make for good public policy if the goal is
to reduce rural poverty? Compared to cash transfers,where it is possible
to “just give the poor the money” (Hanlon et al., 2010), asset transfers
are clearly more complicated and have a more limited scope as not
everyone can be a successful small-scale farmer. It also remains to be
determined if the increases in family well-being detected by the South
African land redistributionprogramspill over into the kinds of investment
in child human capital detected in conditional and unconditional cash
transfer programs. Subject to these limitations, the impacts detected
herewould seem tomotivate further experimentationwith asset transfer
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